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Abstract Two decades of New Public Management have placed agencifiction high
on the agenda of administrative policy-makers. However, agencification (and de-
agencification) has been one of the enduring themes of public administration.
Agencies organized at arm’s length from ministerial departments have fairly often
been located outside of the capital or political centre. Although practitioners tend to
assign some weight to central versus peripheral location as regards political-
administrative behavior, this relationship has been almost totally ignored by scholars
in the field. In this paper, based on a large-N elite survey, we show that agency
autonomy, agency influence and inter-institutional coordination seem to be relatively
unaffected by agency site. This study also specifies some conditions under which
this finding is valid.
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Introduction
During the last couple of decades public administration has experienced a shift in the
balance between bureaucratic autonomy and bureaucratic integration, marked by
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‘agencification’ (Thynne 2003: 323). ‘Agencification’ has signified a transfer of
government activities to agency-type organization vertically specialized outside
ministerial departments. Related to the New Public Management (NPM) movement,
governments across continents have established agencies at arm’s length from
ministerial departments in order to take care of certain regulatory and administrative
tasks (Pollitt et al. 2004; Verhoest et al. 2004). For many of the same reasons
agencification has also taken place at the European Union (EU) level. These
developments have been accompanied by a rapidly growing scholarly literature on
agencification at the national level as well as at the EU level. (For an overview of the
literature on national agencification, see Christensen and Lægreid 2006; Pollitt and
Bouckaert 2004. As regards the EU level, see Barbieri and Ongaro 2008; Groenleer
2006; Wettenhall 2005.) The vast majority of the ‘agencification’ scholarship has
focused attention towards administrative history, reform and change and less on the
effects of agencification (e.g. Pollitt et al. 2004). However, to the extent that this
literature has explored what effects agencification might cause on actual political-
administrative behavior organization structures, procedures and legal capacities have
served as key independent variables (Thynne 2003; Yesilkagit and van Thiel 2008;
Egeberg and Trondal 2009). Yet, agencification seems in practice fairly often
accompanied by geographical relocation away from the national capital or, in the
case of the EU, from Brussels to places outside Belgium. This spatial dimension has
largely been neglected in studies of agencification effects. Although an old topic of
administrative science (e.g. Gulick 1937), in the study of state building, party
formation and voting behavior (Rokkan and Urwin 1982), as well as the symbolic
meaning of architecture (Goodsell 1977), the effects of place or site has been largely
neglected in public administration scholarship. This paper aims at filling this lacuna.
The question posed is: Does the geographical site of agencies matter with respect to
agency autonomy, agency influence, and inter-institutional coordination? The
conclusions benefits from a large-N elite survey among agency officials (N=1452).
The value added of this study is twofold:
– First, it fills a gap in existing agencification scholarship by adding a spatial
dimension.
– Secondly, it tests the extent to which site can be an instrument of administrative
policy. Organization studies indicate that the physical location of offices affects
coordination and information exchange (Pfeffer 1982; Jacobsen 1989; Egeberg
1994; Therborn 2006; Hatch and Cunliffe 2006). Governments and the
European Commission as well often assume a causal relationship between
geographical distance between agencies and ministerial departments/Commis-
sion DGs on the one hand and the actual autonomy of agencies on the other (see
below). This study demonstrates, however, that site is not significantly related to
agency autonomy, agency influence, and inter-institutional coordination.
The absence of the spatial dimension in the literature on the effects of
agencification is puzzling since practitioners sometimes justify often highly
contested relocations by arguing that physical distance might serve to underpin the
intended autonomy of agencies from political executives. The geographical location
and re-location of government institutions also tend to mobilize more attention and
resistance from stakeholders than for example organizing and reorganizing such
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institutions (Meyer and Stensaker 2009). For example, when the Norwegian
government in 2003 decided to move some national agencies out of the capital
Oslo it was argued that geographical distance was instrumental in augmenting
agency autonomy vis-à-vis the respective ministries. The responsible minister for the
2003 reform claimed that “the agencies will gain stronger independence outside of
Oslo…” (Norman 2004: 98—authors’ translation). The same minister argued in the
succeeding Parliamentary debate that “re-location is good agency policy because it
contributes to increased de facto independence” (Hommen 2003: 39—authors’
translation). In short, geographical dispersion of government institutions was
considered an instrument of administrative policy. Similarly, the European
Commission sees geographical dispersion of Community institutions as part of its
administrative policy. With particular reference to the geographical localization of
EU-level agencies, the European Commission has argued that,
“the fact that regulatory agencies are spread around the EU, whilst executive
agencies are housed in Brussels or Luxembourg, is just the most obvious
symbol of their very different relationship with the Commission” (European
Commission 2008: 3). “The Commission also feels that the agency’s
[geographical] seat is a constituent element of the basic act and should
therefore be included in it” (European Commission 2005: 4; see also Szapiro
2005: 3).
The fact that the Norwegian central government consists of national agencies that
are located in the capital Oslo as well as outside of Oslo makes it possible to analyze
potential consequences of agency site. Somewhat surprisingly, this study shows that
site doesn’t seem to matter very much as regards agency autonomy, agency influence
or inter-institutional coordination. However, one essential note is warranted here:
The agencies studied are randomly distributed geographically as regards their formal
autonomy. Hence, more autonomous agencies were not selected for geographical
relocation by the Norwegian government. Concomitantly, the observations reported
in this study are not explained by an overlap between the formal autonomy of
agencies and their geographical locus. The mainly non-correlates of agency site as
reported in this study are thoroughly discussed in the concluding section. Before
presenting the empirical analysis, however, the next section suggests a theoretical
argument on the role of organizational locus. The subsequent sections describe our
data and method before presenting the empirical findings.
Organizational locus—the theoretical argument
Face-to-face contacts appear in general to be highly appreciated when critical
decisions are made in organizations (Jablin 1987: 394). Jönsson et al. (2000: 186)
argue that processes involving considerable uncertainty, unpredictability and surprise
require information exchange via face-to-face contacts and group conversation. A
large-N questionnaire study among government officials revealed that 72% deemed
face-to-face contact in formal meetings to be important for carrying out their daily
tasks while other face-to-face contacts were emphasized by 68% (Egeberg 1994).
Such decision-making through face-to face-interaction presupposes a common site
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and cannot be conducted by modern communication technologies (Therborn 2006).
Thus, such interaction might be sensitive to the physical arrangement of
organizations and to physical distances. Although practitioners fairly often talk
about what can be gained from locating entities together or separately (as in our
case), the phenomenon has attracted marginal scholarly attention. Goodsell (1977,
1988) has focused on the symbolic aspects of interior designs and architecture and
how they might express variants of bureaucratic culture and political authority,
however, without dealing with behavioral consequences. A large-N questionnaire
study showed that government officials’ contact patterns are, when controlling for
organizational role, somewhat related to their physical placement. However, the
causal direction of the relationship could not be ascertained (Egeberg 1994, 2003).
Jacobsen’s (1989) study design solved this causal problem. He focused on the effects
of several physical rearrangements of ministerial departments, in which the formal
organizational structure remained unchanged, and demonstrated that relocating
ministerial departments into the main building of their respective ministries
increased the level of interdepartmental communication and coordination (Jacobsen
1989). Organization studies in other contexts point to similar effects of physical
location of offices (Pfeffer 1982; Hatch and Cunliffe 2006).
On this background, we might expect that agency site makes some difference as
regards agency autonomy, agency influence and inter-institutional coordination.
However, there is one noteworthy difference between the ministerial department case
referred to above (Jacobsen 1989) and the national agency case dealt with in this paper.
In the former case, due to the physical proximity of ministerial departments, not only
face-to-face contact in formal and arranged meetings but also unplanned face-to-face
interaction could be affected. In the agency case, due to the fact that even agencies
situated in Oslo are placed in separate buildings at a certain distance from each other
and from ministries, parliament and headquarters of interest groups, only the frequency
of formal and planned face-to-face meetings can in practice be affected by location
outside of the capital. Agency location outside of the capital makes meetings with
institutions and organizations in the capital more costly both in terms of money and
time. In addition, such location could also impact on the frequency of meetings with
institutions outside of Oslo, such as (domestic) regional administration and EU
institutions, since traveling in that case may become even more costly. The reason is
that the structure of the airline and rail network often is arranged in a way that makes
traveling via the capital necessary. The forms of contact that cannot be expected to be
affected by physical distance are email, phone, post and video conferences.
Our data do not allow us to discriminate between the various forms of contact.
What this study does is to use seven proxies as indicators of agency autonomy,
agency influence and inter-institutional coordination: contact patterns, steering
signals, officials’ identities, agencies success in getting arguments across, coordina-
tion patterns, and finally mutual trust.
– First, the frequency of contact in general will serve as an indicator of the
potential for agency autonomy, agency influence, and inter-institutional
coordination:
○ On the one hand, the less contact the more agency autonomy, the less agency
influence, and the less inter-institutional co-ordination.
100 M. Egeberg, J. Trondal
○ On the other hand, the more contact the less agency autonomy, the more
agency influence, and the more inter-institutional co-ordination.
In addition to measuring ‘agency autonomy’ by frequency of contacts, ‘agency
autonomy’ is also measured by the next three proxies:
– How important various actors in the environment are perceived to be when
crucial decisions are made within one’s own issue area
– The extent to which steering signals from other actors are emphasized
– The extent to which agency personnel identify themselves with the central
administration as a whole. The expectation is that identification with the
executive in general means that broader concerns are taken into consideration
when decisions are made; thus the agency is probably less independent.
Next, ‘agency influence’ is operationalized as the following proxy:
– The extent to which agencies succeed in getting their arguments across.
Finally, ‘inter-institutional coordination’ is measured by the final two proxies:
– How good coordination among various institutions is deemed to be
– The perceived degree of mutual trust.
Data and method
Whereas the bulk of public administration studies rely on low-N case studies with
the main use of interview and documentary data, only few studies apply quantitative
survey and large-N analysis (Haverland 2006). This paper relies on large-N elite
survey data within the Norwegian central administration, covering a huge number of
topics; inter alia officials’ backgrounds and careers, their tasks, contact patterns,
assessments of power relationships and administrative reforms, etc. Over the last
30 years, a group of Norwegian scholars (including the authors) have conducted
surveys in the Norwegian central administration each decade (1976, 1986, 1996 and
2006). This study applies data from the 2006-survey because only this survey
contains a significant geographical dispersion of agencies. This survey was
conducted as an online survey by the Norwegian Social Science Data Service
encompassing officials from all Norwegian ministries (18 ministries in total) and
subordinated agencies (49 in total). The survey at the ministerial level was sent to all
officials at the level equivalent to the ‘A-level’ with a minimum of 1 year in office.
Appointment at this level usually requires a university degree. The survey at the
agency level was distributed to a random selection of every third official at the ‘A-
level’ with at least 1 year in office. The main reason for selecting only a random
number of agency officials is the large staff numbers in the agencies. This analysis
uses only the agency data because all ministries are located in Oslo. The total
number of responses at the agency level is 1452, giving a response rate of 59. In
sum, this survey represents the most extensive analyses of domestic core-executives
in international comparison, and perhaps the only data set that enables an assessment
of the potential effects of organizational locus.
Agencification and Location: Does Agency Site Matter? 101
In the next section, the organizational locus variable is dichotomized by using the
address of the agency: Of the 49 agencies included in the data base, 30 agencies
(61%) are located in the capital of the country (Oslo) and 19 agencies (39%) are
located outside the capital. This implies that our dichotomized variable ‘agency site’
includes 1119 (77%) officials in the capital and 332 (23%) officials located outside
of the capital. The dichotomized variable is fairly lopsided which may accompany
some difficulties with obtaining significant observations in regression analyses.
However, in this study we only present tables containing percentages, Pearson’s r
and the level of significance. Due to the large N, even very weak correlations (i.e.
less than .10) may be statistically significant. However, ‘unpatterned’ (single)
correlations at this level, even if statistically significant, will not be assigned weight
to.
One caveat is needed: As in most social sciences based on interview and survey
data, the observations reported in this article rest on the perceptions of the
respondents. Admittedly, there are no guarantees that actors’ perceptions of behavior
are always reflecting actual behavior. Studying actors’ perceptions render the
conclusions vulnerable to perceptual errors. However, perceptions serve as cognitive
and normative frames for action rendering it more likely than not that particular
behavioral dynamics are associated with certain perceptional patterns (Aberbach et
al. 1981: 86; Van Knippenberg and Van Leeuwen 2001: 250).
Finally, to what extent are our empirical observations generalizable? Other
countries than Norway have also located and relocated national agencies outside of
the administrative centre—for example in the case of US federal agencies, Swedish
agencies and UK agencies. Secondly, the impact of organizational locus may also be
relevant at other levels of governance than the national one. For example,
agencification at the EU level has resulted in more than 30 agency-like bodies
organized at arm’s length from the Community institutions in Brussels (Trondal and
Jeppesen 2008). Most of these agencies were located outside Brussels when they
were established in the first place. At present EU-level agencies are scattered all
around the European continent. However, there is currently no research on the
effects of this geographical dispersion of EU-level agencies. Thus, the results
reported in this paper might be of relevance also for understanding the role of agency
site at the EU level.
Findings: the (almost) non-correlates of agency site
Table 1 shows that agency officials’ pattern of contact reflects very much the sectoral
specialization of the government administration. Thus, horizontal interaction is
clearly less frequent than vertical interaction, including contact with the respective
parent ministries. However, there is hardly any significant relationship between
agency site on the one hand and officials’ contact patterns on the other. Not only is
the proportion having frequent contact with actors in the capital about the same
(actors such as ministries, parliament and interest organizations) but this holds for
contact with actors outside of the capital as well (actors such as government regional
administration, county and municipal administration, and EU institutions). Two
correlations are statistically significant; however, they are so weak that we cannot
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assign any weight to them. These two negative relationships are also contrary to
what was theoretically predicted.
Next, Tables 2, 3 and 4 apply dependent variables that aim at tapping ‘agency
autonomy’ more precisely than the general contact variable. Table 2 reveals that
superior authorities are indeed considered to be important when agency officials are
to make crucial decisions. However, agency locus doesn’t make much difference in
this respect. Neither the impact that affected interest groups might have seems to be
associated with the location of agencies. This pattern is confirmed in Table 3:
Although agency personnel primarily emphasize professional concerns in their work,
the considerable weight assigned to signals from affected interest groups and the
parent ministry is clearly not contingent upon agency site. Table 4 unveils that the
same holds for the scope of identification: site doesn’t strongly affect the extent to
which ‘whole-of-government’ concerns are paid attention to. Again, the few
correlations that are statistically significant are weak or irrelevant (professional
considerations, own agency identification) and therefore not given further attention.
Table 5 presents a dependent variable that aims at measuring ‘agency influence’
more precisely than the general contact variable used in Table 1. A considerable
proportion of agency officials see their respective agencies as relatively influential,
and particularly so in relationship to their lead ministries. However, in general, only
weak correlations exist between agency site on the one hand and the ability to get
one’s arguments across on the other. Agency influence vis-à-vis the European
Commission is, however, somewhat stronger correlated with agency site: Contrary to
what was expected, agencies outside of the capital report getting their viewpoints
Table 1 Per cent officials having contacts with the following actors, by agency site
Agencies in
the capital
Agencies outside
of the capital
Pearson’s r
Political leadership in parent ministry 4 4 −.02
Officials in parent ministry 31 30 −.00
Other ministries (political leadership and officials) 9 7 .02
Other agencies 23 25 −.04
Own regional and local service 40 41 .00
Other regional and local services 14 13 .00
County and municipal administration 17 15 .04
Relevant standing committees in the domestic Parliament 0 0 −.07*
Other standing committees in the domestic Parliament 0 0 −.02
Employment and trade organizations 10 14 −.06**
Other organizations 14 18 −.04
The European Commission 3 5 −.03
EU-level agencies 3 5 −.01
Mean N 1094 303
This table combines values 1 and 2 on the following five-point scale: every week or more often (value 1),
every month (value 2), sometimes (value 3), never (value 4), not relevant (value5). Pearson’s r, however, is
run with values 1–4. Agencies in the capital (value 1), agencies outside of the capital (value 2)
*p≤0.05, **p≤0.01
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and wishes more effectively accepted by the European Commission than agencies in
the capital. Since neither this correlation is particularly strong, and since we are not
able to grasp the underlying mechanism in this case, we will not go further into this.
Also, supporting this view, we have already seen that agency site doesn’t make a
significant difference neither as regards contact with the Commission (Table 1) nor
as regards the perceived importance of the Commission (Table 2).
Finally, Tables 6 and 7 are meant to provide more valid observations of ‘inter-
institutional coordination’ than the general contact variable used in Table 1. Not
Table 3 Per cent officials who deem the following considerations to be important when they do their
work, by agency site
Agencies in
the capital
Agencies outside
of the capital
Pearson’s r
Signals from the political leadership (cabinet, minister,
junior minister in parent ministry)
68 63 .03
Signals from officials in the parent ministry 75 72 .02
Professional considerations 93 97 −.08*
Signals from affected groups, clients, user groups 76 78 −.01
Mean N 1026 307
This table combines values 1 and 2 on the following five-point scale: very important (value 1), fairly
important (value 2), both/and (value 3), fairly unimportant (value 4), very unimportant (value 5). Pearson’s
r is run with all values 1–5. Agencies in the capital (value 1), agencies outside of the capital (value 2)
*p≤0.05
Table 2 Per cent officials who deem the following actors important when crucial decisions are made
within their own issue area, by agency site
Agencies in
the capital
Agencies outside
of the capital
Pearson’s r
Own ministry 75 73 .03
Own regional or local service 34 38 −.04
Other ministries or services 28 23 .04
County and municipal administration 16 11 .09*
The domestic Parliament 53 49 .03
The Government 55 50 .01
Employment and trade organizations 16 19 −.05
Other organizations 14 12 .01
The European Commission 16 18 −.06
EU-level agencies 11 11 −.02
Mean N 938 276
This table combines values 1 and 2 on the following six-point scale: very important (value 1), fairly
important (value 2), both/and (value 3), fairly unimportant (value 4), very unimportant (value 5), do not
know/not relevant (value 6). Pearson’s r, however, is run with values 1–5. Agencies in the capital (value
1), agencies outside of the capital (value 2)
*p≤0.05
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surprisingly, given the sectorally organized government, coordination within one’s
own policy sector is perceived as better than coordination across sectors. However,
once more the location of national agencies doesn’t seem to make a noteworthy
difference in this respect. Only one relationship is statistically significant in the
expected direction, and this relationship is a weak one. As shown in Table 7, mutual
trust, which might be seen as highly conducive to actual coordination among
institutions, doesn’t at all vary by agency site.
Concluding discussion
When studying the effects that agencification might have on actual political-
administrative behavior, inter alia related to agency autonomy, political scientists
have focused on organizational structure and procedures as independent variables.
Table 5 Per cent officials who report getting their viewpoints and wishes accepted within the following
institutions
Agencies in
the capital
Agencies outside
of the capital
Pearson’s r
The Government 45 44 .04
The domestic Parliament 42 40 .05
The parent ministry 65 62 .08*
Other ministries or government services 28 24 .08*
County and municipal administration 26 23 .03
The European Commission 8 14 −.15**
The public in general, the public opinion 38 36 −.02
Mean N 949 277
This table combines values 1 and 2 on the following six-point scale: very well (value 1), fairly well (value
2), both/and (value 3), fairly bad (value 4), very bad (value 5), do not know/not relevant (value 6).
Pearson’s r, however, is run with values 1–5. Agencies in the capital (value 1), agencies outside of the
capital (value 2)
*p≤0.05, **p≤0.01
Table 4 Per cent officials who report allegiance to and identification with the following entities
Agencies in
the capital
Agencies outside
of the capital
Pearson’s r
Own agency as a whole 77 82 −.08*
The central administration as a whole 37 42 −.06*
Mean N 954 278
This table combines values 1 and 2 on the following six-point scale: very strong (value 1), fairly strong (value
2), both/and (value 3), fairly weak (value 4), veryweak (value 5), not relevant (value 6). Pearson’s r, however, is
run with values 1–5. Agencies in the capital (value 1), agencies outside of the capital (value 2)
*p≤0.05
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Even though geographical relocation fairly often (but far from always) seems to have
accompanied agencification, the potential effect of agency site has so far been
neglected in such studies. Interestingly, practitioners have, on the other hand, usually
paid some attention to what can be achieved, e.g. in terms of actual coordination or
institutional autonomy, by co-locating or separating institutions physically. Thus,
relocation of already established national agencies has also taken place indepen-
dently of on-going agencification processes. Our study documents that agency site
doesn’t make a noteworthy difference along the dimensions selected for measuring
‘agency autonomy’, ‘agency influence’ and ‘inter-institutional coordination’.
Do these findings contradict the observations reported in the second section of
this paper on the behavioral consequences of moving ministerial departments into or
out of the main building of the respective ministries? Not necessarily: due to the
physical proximity, these latter reshufflings also impacted on the unplanned
encounters between officials. As argued, such face-to-face interaction could
probably not be affected by agency relocation since agencies already were at a
certain distance from other institutions even within the capital. Thus, since email,
phone, post and video conferences are insensitive to physical distance, only the
frequency of arranged meetings might be affected by agency locus. If our study had
been conducted a hundred years ago, the results might have been quite different.
Table 6 Perceptions of coordination: “How would you characterize coordination in your issue area along
the following dimensions?” (per cent saying “good”)
Agencies in
the capital
Agencies outside
of the capital
Pearson’s r
Coordination between government institutions
within own sector
42 46 −.06
Coordination with government institutions in other sectors 21 26 −.03
Coordination with county and municipal administration 20 14 .08*
Mean N 954 278
This table combines values 1 and 2 on the following six-point scale: very good (value 1), fairly good (value 2),
both/and (value 3), fairly bad (value 4), very bad (value 5), not relevant (value 6). Pearson’s r, however, is run
with values 1–5. Agencies in the capital (value 1), agencies outside of the capital (value 2).
*p≤0.05
Table 7 Mutual trust between own agency and the parent ministry (percentages)
Agencies in the capital Agencies outside of the capital Pearson’s r
Fairly good or better 74 76 .01
N 961 283
Original question: “How would you characterize the level of mutual trust between your agency and the
parent ministry?”. These values combine value 1 and 2 on the following six-point scale: very good (value
1), fairly good (value 2), both/and (value 3), fairly bad (value 4), very bad (value 5), do not know (value
6). Pearson’s r, however, is run with values 1–5. Agencies in the capital (value 1), agencies outside of the
capital (value 2)
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This is largely due to the fact that location seems to be unrelated to autonomy,
influence and inter-institutional coordination because of the efficiency of modern
communication and transportation.
Arguably, though, it may be difficult to generalize or findings both across time
and across institutions. After all, we have focused on already semi-detached, often
highly specialized, agencies whose ‘need’ for being steered, influential or
coordinated with others is relatively modest. Therefore, it is still possible that
organizational locus will make a difference if we instead concentrate on bodies that
are in general relatively more involved on the input-side of the policy-making
process. Given that many decision processes are often hectic and intertwined, to be
on the spot means that many actors and arenas can be reached in a relatively short
time. Thus, under such circumstances, being located in the capital, or permanently
represented in Brussels via delegations, offices etc. might turn out to be highly
convenient. Hence, the impact of site might be conditioned by policy stage and the
temporal dimensions of decision-making.
There are potentially numerous consequences of agency site that are not measured
in our study. For example, agency dispersion might have symbolic effects: agencies
may come to look more independent by being placed outside of the political centre.
Also, for example, locating EU-level agencies outside of Brussels might give a
signal that the EU bureaucracy is not growing. Moreover, the centre makes itself
visible throughout the whole territory by geographical dispersion of its institutional
apparatus. More concrete, de-concentration of agencies may provide additional
professional job opportunities in geographical areas with a shortage of such jobs.
Finally, agencies may come physically closer to professional and scientific milieus,
or industries, that are of particular relevance to their activities.
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